Breaking ECC2K-130
RSA, the Security Division of EMC, USA
Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/541 (5 Nov 2009)
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009:541,
author={Daniel V. Bailey and Lejla Batina and Daniel J. Bernstein and Peter Birkner and Joppe W. Bos and Hsieh-Chung Chen and Chen-Mou Cheng and Gauthier van Damme and Giacomo de Meulenaer and Luis Julian Dominguez Perez and Junfeng Fan and Tim Guneysu and Frank Gurkaynak and Thorsten Kleinjung and Tanja Lange and Nele Mentens and Ruben Niederhagen and Christof Paar and Francesco Regazzoni and Peter Schwabe and Leif Uhsadel and Anthony Van Herrewege and Bo-Yin Yang},
title={Breaking ECC2K-130},
howpublished={Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2009/541},
year={2009},
note={url{http://eprint.iacr.org/}}
}
Elliptic-curve cryptography is becoming the standard public-key primitive not only for mobile devices but also for high-security applications. Advantages are the higher cryptographic strength per bit in comparison with RSA and the higher speed in implementations. To improve understanding of the exact strength of the elliptic-curve discrete-logarithm problem, Certicom has published a series of challenges. This paper describes breaking the ECC2K-130 challenge using a parallelized version of Pollard’s rho method. This is a major computation bringing together the contributions of several clusters of conventional computers, PlayStation~3 clusters, computers with powerful graphics cards and FPGAs. We also give /preseestimates for an ASIC design. In particular we present – our choice and analysis of the iteration function for the rho method; – our choice of finite field arithmetic and representation; – detailed descriptions of the implementations on a multitude of platforms: CPUs, Cells, GPUs, FPGAs, and ASICs; – details about running the attack.
November 21, 2010 by hgpu
